Now that the presidential election that wouldn't end has finally
ended, if Democrats are serious about recapturing the White House in
four years, they need to carefully examine how they blew it. Everyone
wants to know how a sitting vice president, running on a record of
broad government experience and economic prosperity, could lose to an
inarticulate bumbler named George W. Bush. After the polls
closed, Democrats immediately began blaming Ralph Nader for Gore's
problems. While it is technically true that Nader's withdrawal from the
race would have quickly propelled Gore into the White House, the
problem runs deeper than Nader1s candidacy or the disenfranchisement of
African American voters in Florida. Gore couldn't carry Tennessee, his
home state. He couldn't carry Arkansas, the president's home
state. In Missouri, a dead man won on the Democratic ticket for the
Senate, and Gore couldn1t even carry the Show Me state. In effect,
"Dead Man Walking" outran Gore. The problem was neither Nader
nor an election whose outcome wasn't determined until five weeks after
Election Day. The problem was the Democratic Party. If
Democrats learn nothing else from the protracted debacle, they should
understand that the country does not want two Republican parties. In
recent years, Democrats have tried to out-Republican the Republicans.
And that paved the way for Gore's surprising loss to George "Dubya." Democrats
have had plenty of experience losing national elections. When he was
governor of Arkansas, Bill Clinton decided to do something about it.
After seeing Democrats lose the White House in five of the previous six
outings, Clinton carefully crafted a strategy to win back 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue. Clinton, perhaps the most masterful
politician of our time, managed to put forth a basically conservative
platform while simultaneously reassuring African Americans, women and
labor that he was their best friend. This coalition of conservative
party activists and progressives such as Jesse Jackson provided the
support base for his two-term presidency. Al Gore, trying to
build on the Clinton road map to the White House, said all the right
things to African Americans - pledging support for affirmative action
and opposing Driving While Black stops - while tipping his hat to the
Right by favoring capital punishment and backing the movement to keep
Elian Gonzalez in the United States instead of having him reunited with
his father in Cuba. Gore's problem was that it took him too
long to return to his base. It was just before the National Democratic
Convention that a struggling Al Gore gave up his obsession with wining
over the "independent voter" and moved to reclaim the traditional
Democratic base - Blacks, women and labor. It was only then that he
experienced a rise in the polls. However, by then, it was too late. In
the end, it was African Americans who proved yet again to be the most
loyal bloc of Democratic voters, providing the margin of victory in
several battleground states, including in Michigan and Pennsylvania.
For example, Gore carried Michigan by only three percentage points.
Bush out-polled Gore among Whites in that state by eight percentage
points. But the Black turnout of more than 90 percent tilted the
election in Gore's favor. In Florida, African-Americans turned out in
record numbers, reaching 952,000, up from 527,000 in 1996. We
have already seen how a highly-politicized Supreme Court effectively
ended Al Gore's candidacy for president while disenfranchising some
Black voters in Florida. With George W. Bush expected to appoint at
least two new members to the court, it will only get worse.
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